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January 5, 2020

Re: Administrative Appeal on behalf of I
Re-appearance 10/9/2Q19, Denied 10/22/2019
To Whom it May Concern,

is currently 69 years old and in his 49th year of incarceration, for
~
murdering two on-duty police officers in 1971. Mr.
became parole eligible in 2002 and
COMPAS scores, achievements while
has appeared before the Board thirteen times. Mr.
incarcerated, and family and community support indicate that he presents the lowest possible risk
of violence or recidivism. He has never engaged in violent prison misconduct of any kind, has only
tickets for minor infractions, and has not had a ticket in several years. He has, through
programming, therapy, and education, garnered tremendous insight into his youth and the social,
political, familial and psychological underpinnings to his having joined the Black Liberation Army
and participated in the heinous taking of life that constitutes the instant offense. He wants, more
than anything, to enjoy whatever time he has left with his mother, siblings, children and
grandchildren and, if possible, contribute to constructive police-community relations.
could do to demonstrate rehabilitation, remorse, and
Fundamentally, everything that Mr.
the potential for successful release, he has done.

Mr.

is being denied parole
The Board’s latest hearing and decision indicate that Mr.
not because of any founded determination that he poses a risk to others or that he lacks insight into
or remorse regarding the damage he caused. Instead, the Board repeatedly, improperly, and
impermissibly contorts both the law and the record to support their pre-determined conclusion that
murdered two police officers, he should die in prison.
because Mr.
’s universally
Instead of offering individualized reasons for departing from Mr.
positive COMPAS scores, or identifying aggravating circumstances that warrant further
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incarceration, the Board improperly and erroneously weighed COMPAS criteria against each
other, and improperly and erroneously used factors from outside COMPAS to do so. Without basis
s expressions of remorse and demonstrations of
in the record, the Board contorted Mr.
insight into his crime into a finding that he was without remorse and inappropriately righteous.
s widespread community support, the urgent request by one of
Instead of considering Mr.
be released, or the type and length of his sentence,
the victim’s family members that Mr.
the Board improperly relied upon the impersonal deluge of community opposition; instead of
taking into consideration all that he has done to grow and change, they fixate upon that which is
immutable. The Board’s most recent decision should thus be reversed, and a de novo hearing
conducted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

.

A September 2019 Split Decision

On September 10, 2019, Mr.
appeared before Commissioners Drake and Davis. He had
at
appeared before Commissioner Drake his appearance immediately prior, on December 11, 2018,
when Commissioner Drake had voted to deny him parole and impose a fifteen-month hold. ST1 at 3
(Commissioner Shapiro dissenting). The September hearing yielded a split decision (leading to the
inference that Commissioner Drake had changed his position and come to support Mr.
’s.
re-appeared before Commissioners Agostini, Davis, and Corley on
release), and as such, Mr.
October 9, 2019.

B. October Denial

On October 22, 2019, the Board issued their thirteenth denial of parole, with a one-year
hold. The Board did so after a more than four-hour long hearing. The Board wrote that “release at
this time remains incompatible with the welfare and safety of society and would still so deprecate
your offense as to undermine respect for the law.” (emphasis added). The decision went on to
extensively recite the facts of the instant offense. Then, the decision recognized that Mr.
now acknowledges his role in the instant offense. “However,” the decision reads, “your criminal
engagements in California are extensive and also includes crimes against law enforcement. You
have demonstrated a continuation of negative behaviors that began during adolescence and
escalated quickly thereafter.” Noting Mr.
age, “adverse challenges” he endured during
his formative years, and low COMPAS scores, the decision nonetheless departed from COMPAS
because you come across as still believing in the righteousness of your crime and
because your remorse lacks the depth that is necessary to give your low risk of re
offending the necessary weight to overcome the remaining standards that this panel

-

finds you still fall short of.

1

ST denotes the transcript ofthe September appearance that yielded a spl it decision. HT denotes the hearing
transcript of the October 2019 re-appearance. Because the October re-appearance lasted more than four
hours, it is not summarized here; instead, citations to relevant portions are made throughout the Argument.
2
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’s “appropriate case plan”, achievements while
The decision went on to note Mr.
incarcerated, and widespread community support. However, the Board then noted receipt of “many
or more letters in opposition”, which have been considered as well.
The decision then stated that Mr.|
’s criminal history concerned them, and that while
he appeared to have “gained insight into the factors that contributed to [his] feelings, thoughts, and
behaviors that fueled [his] reaction to [his] environment and subsequent negative behaviors”, not
received misbehavior reports, and achieving a great deal while incarcerated, that discretionary
release “shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of
duties while confined.” The decision wrote in conclusion, that release is “not appropriate”, and
“release at this time would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for
the law.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Decisions of the Board of Parole are discretionary and will upheld so long as the Board
complied with the statutory requirements. Executive Law § 259-i. Upon Article 78 petition, a Court
will only annul a denial of parole when it is “arbitrary and capricious” and “irrational bordering
on impropriety.” Russo v. N.Y. State Bd of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980). Case law dictates that
the Parole Board’s written decision is improper if it fails to explain the reasons for denial of parole
“in detail and not in conclusoiy terms.” N.Y. Exec.. Law. 259-i(2)(a); Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dep’t 2014).
Though it need not discuss each factor in detail, a written decision “may not summarily itemize a
petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated or render a conclusory decision parroting the
statutory standard.” Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole , 14 Misc.3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty.
2006).
ARGUMENT

I.

The Board erred when, instead of independently considering COMPAS, remorse,
insight into the crime, and the instant offense as is required by law, it applied an
arbitrary, improper, and opaque weighted scheme

.

—

Though the Board noted the existence various factors community opposition, criminal
history, the facts of the instant offense and offered stock language as to Mr.
s release not
being “compatible” with the welfare of safety and society and the “deprecation” his release would
constitute as to undermine respect for the law, they offered little, in their multi-page decision, in
the way of specific justification for their decision to deny parole. And what was offered specifically
manifested a failure to properly apply the correct legal standard. The Board wrote that they had
s universally laudatory] COMPAS;
decided to depart from [Mr.

—

because you come across as still believing in the righteousness of your crime and
because your remorse lacks the depth that is necessary to give your low risk of re
offending the necessary weight to overcome the remaining standards that this panel
finds you still fall short of

-
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As a preliminary matter, the Board was clear, both during the hearing and in their decision,
s COMPAS scores were universally “low” and “unlikely”, and in eveiy category.
that Mr.
HT at 76-82. There is not a single instance, in the record, of the Board identifying a single
COMPAS criterion which indicated that Mr.
|presents any risk to others or to himself. As
such, there simply exist no “standards” that he “still fall[s] short of.” The Board’s reference to any
such standards or shortcomings was thus irrational, improper, arbitrary and capricious. See Lewis
v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800 (3d Dep’t 2004) (“Board incorrectly referred to petitioner’s conviction as
murder in the first degree, when, in fact, petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree.
Inasmuch as the Board relied on incorrect information in denying petitioner’s request for parole
release , the judgment must be reversed, and a new hearing granted.” ).

Moreover, as argued herein, the Board’s ‘weighing’ so-called shortfalls against Mr.
s low risk of re-offending, and that the assigned weight to his risk of re-offending was
informed in part by Mr.
s righteousness and remorse constituted an arbitrary, improper,
and unauthorized legal standard. Review of relevant regulations, statutes and common law is clear
that the Board was a) required to consider Mr.
s COMPAS and both identify any category
from which they wished to depart and individualized reasons justifying the departure, b)
authorized to consider remorse and insight into the crime as generally relevant to evaluating Mr.
s rehabilitation, and c) only entitled to rely upon the instant offense to deny parole
inasmuch as there remained aggravating circumstances warranting further incarceration. For
failure to apply this correct legal standard and relying instead upon an arbitrary and random
weighted scheme, the Board’s decision should be reversed, and a de novo hearing conducted.

a. The correct legal standard required the Board to consider COMPAS and
justify any departures from it, authorized them to consider remorse and
insight into the crime, and limited reliance upon the instant offense to any
aggravating circumstances warranting further incarceration.
The Parole Board is governed by New York’s Executive Law. Executive Law § 259i(2)(C)(A), begins:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined by after considering if
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare ofsociety and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as
to undermine respect for the law.

§ 259-i(2)(C)(A) then lists the factors the Parole Board must consider when deciding whether to
release someone to parole supervision.

-

The factors are achievements while incarcerated, temporary work release, post release
plans, immigration issues, victim statements, the type and length of sentence, the seriousness of
the offense and criminal history. Id. Within the seriousness of the offense, the Board is authorized
to consider any aggravating circumstances warranting further incarceration. In re King v. N.Y.
State Div. of Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“[Cjertainly
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every murder conviction is inherently a matter of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the
unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of a human life. Since, however, the Legislature has determined
that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some
aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself ’). While the Board
need not give equal weight to each factor, there is no legal mandate that the Board give specific
weight to any particular factor or that they be weighed against each other in any specific fashion.

Guided by the Executive Law, the Parole Board has promulgated a host of regulations that
have the force of law. In 2011, the regulations were amended to read: “in making a release
determination, the Board shall be guided by risk and needs principles.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2.
Accordingly, the Board must, at the very least, review and consider the COMPAS results in order
to fulfill the statutory requirements of “measuring] the rehabilitation of persons appearing before
the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assisting] members of the
state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision.” Diaz
v. New York State Bd of Parole , 42 MIsc. 3d 532, 536 (Sup. Ct , Cayuga Cty., 2013) (citing
Executive Law § 259 c(4). In 2017, the Board went further, enacting 8 NYCRR § 8002.2(a):

-

Risk and Needs Principles: In making a release determination, the Board shall be
guided by risk and needs principles, including the inmate's risk and needs scores as
generated by a periodically validated risk assessment instrument... If a Board
determination, denying release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs
Assessment's scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk
and Needs Assessmentfrom which it departed andprovide an individualized reason
for such departure.

-

[N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs, tit, 9, § 8002.2 {emphasis added)]
Failure to offer individualized reasons for departing from COMPAS will constitute error
warranting reversal and a de novo hearing. Robinson v. Stanford , No 2392-2018 at *2 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019) (“The Board’s conclusory statement that it considered statutory
factors, including petitioner’s risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and need for successful
community re-entry in finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare
of society fails to meet [the requirement of an individualized reason].”). See also, Comfort v.
Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 2018) (finding the Board did not comply with
8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS risk score of felony
violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding that where was a reasonable probability the
petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law); Friedgood v. New York
State Bd. of Parole , 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3d. Dep’t 2005) (absence of record support for its
conclusion that petitioner is likely to reoffend cumulatively render the Board’s decision “so
irrational under the circumstances as to border on impropriety”).

.

While the Board may consider remorse and insight into one’s crime, despite the absence
of statutory authorization, Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000), when the interview transcript,
as here, indicates that Mr.
repeatedly articulated and demonstrated remorse, the Board
cannot base their decision to deny on lack of remorse. Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304 (1st
Dep’t 2005) (“[T]he Board’s perfunctory discussion of petitioner’s alleged lack of insight is

5
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contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decisions...which held that a petitioner’s remorse and insight
into his crimes are highly relevant in evaluating an inmate’s rehabilitative progress...Despite the
critical significance of these factors m evaluating an inmate...the Board’s decision in this case
offers no supportive facts justifying its finding of lack of insight and remorse...[Thus] the court’s
conclusions regarding lack of insight and remorse were based on an inaccurate reading of the
record.”); Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc. 3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty, 2010) (Board’s denial,
which was based on the petitioner failing to show remorse for the victim or her family and not
appearing to understand the seriousness of his crime was contradicted by the record).

The Board was thus required to consider COMPAS, in and of itself, and to offer
individualized reasons for departing from it. If they wanted to depart from Mr.
s low
COMPAS score for risk of re-offending, based upon insufficient remorse or righteousness or other
so-called “standards”, they needed to explain the causal connection. If they deemed COMPAS
scores in some categories to be more important than Mr.
s low score for risk of reoffending, they needed to identify the categories and explain why. Additionally, if they wanted to
consider the general relevance of remorse and righteousness to Mr.
s rehabilitation, the
Board was authorized make specific findings based upon the record. And thirdly, if they intended
to identify aggravating circumstances related to the instant offense that would warrant further
incarceration, they were required to identify them and explain their reasoning. See In re Guzman
v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798 (1st Dep’t 2016) (finding that the fact of petitioner being on parole
when he committed the crime was an aggravating factor); see also Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d
17, 22 (1st Dep’t 2007) (“petitioner’s crimes went well beyond the Unjustifiable taking and tragic
loss of human life that describes every murder...he corruptly embarked on a pattern of
extortion...”); Platten v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole , 47 Misc. 3d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2015)
(describing the petitioner’s crime as “heinous” yet still holding that denial of parole was arbitrary
and capricious because the Board’s decision did not explain why release would be inconsistent
with the welfare of society or deprecate the seriousness of the offense.”).
b. The Board categorically did not apply the correct legal standard, imposing
instead a random, opaque and unauthorized system of weights.

The Board stated, in their decision, that Mr.
’s remorse and attitude towards his
crime were insufficient to give his COMPAS risk of re-offending sufficient weight to overcome
remaining standards in which he fell short. To be clear, they reasoned that factors outside
COMPAS—remorse and attitude were relevant to a category within COMPAS risk of reoffending—as weighed against other, unspecified “standards” in which Mr.
fell short. As
already argued and as demonstrated by his universally low and unlikely COMPAS scores, there
were no such “standards” in which Mr.
was deficient. Additionally, the analysis employed
by the Board is categorically not that which is authorized by the Executive Law and accompanying
regulations and common law decisions. Perfunctory conclusions that Mr.
lacked remorse
or expressed righteousness and that, in doing so, failed to adequately bolster one COMPAS score
weighed against other unspecified “standards” was not authorized by law. Moreover, the Board’s
own conclusion was contradicted both by his universally low and unlikely COMPAS scores that
indicate his fitness for release, and their decision that Mr.
had “gained insight into the
factors that contributed” to the instant offense, which the panel applauded. Dec. at 4. For failure

—

—
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to correctly apply the operative legal standards, the Board's decision should be reversed, and a de
novo hearing conducted.

II .

The Board’s arbitrary, improper and opaque weighted scheme incorporated a
finding that is utterly belied by the record: that Mr.
lacked remorse and
expressed righteousness as to his crime.

As already argued supra at I, the Board employed a patently incorrect legal standard when
unfit for release. That incorrect legal standard also incorporated a factual
they deemed Mr.
expressed inadequate remorse and
finding that is utterly belied by the record that Mr
inappropriate righteousness. This erroneous factual determination itself warrants reversal and a de
novo hearing. See Rivera v. Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503, at *2 (2d Dep't 2019) (Board’s finding
that release was not compatible with the welfare of society based upon prison disciplinary record
was without support in the record); Coleman v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision,157 A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“Contrary to the Parole Board’s determination
that the petitioner 'distance[d]’ himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner

—

.

took full responsibility for his actions...”).

|repeatedly referred to his crime in intensely negative terms. See, e.g., HT at 41
Mr.|
(describing the crime as “horrible”); see also, HT at 61 (describing the taking of life as “tragic”).
He unambiguously disavowed the militant ideology that led him to commit such a heinous act. HT
at 94. He clearly considers police officers heroes and expresses profound desire to contribute to
constructive community police relations. HT at 96 97 He breaks down into tears when he tries to
describe the damage that he had done. HT at 98. 2

- .

-

described his own “righteousness”, he described it as a
To whatever extent Mr.
thing
of
the
past
occurrence
and one that was inextricably linked to the story of
a
historical
to even attempt to take responsibility or express
the crimes themselves. Indeed, for Mr.
remorse for his crime without communicating his adolescent adoption of the “righteous” ideology
of the Black Panther Party and the Black Liberation Army would be laughable to any parole
commissioner; the ideology was part and parcel of his crime and no amount of revisionism or
avoidance will ever change that.

—

—

As such, Mr.
J repeatedly described his emergence as a militant as being the result
of his reaction to his home life and the goings-on in the civil rights and black power movements.
See HT at 12 (describing his grief at the death of his uncle at the hands of the police); see also, HT
at 14 (describing John Carlos and other black radical influences in his life); HTat 19-20 (describing
becoming homeless as a teenager and finding belonging and purpose with high school friends who
had joined the Black Panther Party); HT at 22 (describing his problem with authority as a result of
2

s articulation of remorse was just as heartfelt at his original appearance at which
Mr.
Commissioner Davis was present in September 2019. There, he was open and honest that he needed therapy
to process his early childhood trauma, ST at 3011 , his articulation that tire political and social context of
the 1960’s and 70’s fed his predisposition to militancy, ST at 19-21, his deep regret at taking the lives of
for supporting his release, ST
and
ST at 21, his gratitude for
Officers
at 41 , his commitment to avoiding being triggered both within and without prison, ST at 67- 71 , and his
desire to contribute to positive community-police relations. ST at 79-92.
7
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both his relationship with his stepfather and negative interactions with the police); HT at 32
(attributing his criminal activity to leaving home too early and needing to survive on the streets);
HT at 34 (describing being tantalized by the regalia and militancy of the BPP); HT at 69
(describing the crime as a misguided attempt at retaliation and one where he was trying to prove
himself to elders in the Black Liberation Army).
He did not attempt to lay blame at the feet of his parents or of law enforcement; he did not
seek to excuse his behavior as either the result of trauma or history. Instead, he simply sought to
communicate the intertwining influences of his adolescence and take responsibility for the
was clear that he could not describe his ideology
horrendous action he took as a result. Mr.
without describing the social and political conditions of the time, HT at 23-24, but in no way
communicated an enduring righteousness about his historical beliefs and actions. At no point when
discussing the details of the crime did he attempt to hide from or justify the fact that his intention,
on the night of the murder, was to shoot to kill both Officers
and
HT at 49.
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Mr.
was clear that he does not espouse
these ideas today. To whatever extent he viewed the police in the 1970’s as an occupying force,
HT at 35, he now sees them as heroes. HT at 94. To whatever extent he thought that African
American communities needed to defend themselves from the police, he now believes that that
thinking was “bad”, HT at 44, “and based on a lack of maturity and lack of understanding”, HT at
61, and wants to contribute to constructive community-police relations. HT at 96-98 And to
whatever extent he was ambivalent about taking the life of a member of law enforcement, he is
now full of sorrow and remorse at the damage he has done. HT at 59, 89, 98, 99, 100.

His remorse and historic righteousness are clear on the face of the record. Had the Board
properly considered all of the evidence of remorse and recognized that Mr.
expressed
righteousness only inasmuch as it was necessary to take responsibility for his crime, there would
have been no basis for a departure from his COMPAS scores, a finding that there existed any
aggravating circumstance warranting further incarceration, or a determination that he was unfit for
release to parole supervision. While an utterly unrepentant and persistently militant parole
applicant might be one for whom a departure from COMPAS and/or determination that there
existed an aggravating circumstances might be warranted, Mr.|
is no such person. The
Board’s decision should be reversed, and a de novo hearing held.

III.

The Board erred when it gave greater weight to qualitative and unauthorized
so-called “community opposition” and cheriy-picked facts from Mr.
criteria
s criminal history — than quantitative and authorized criteria: the type
and length of Mr.
s sentence, Mr.
s COMPAS scores, release plan,
achievements while incarcerated, widespread community support, and the
recommendation of one of his victims.

—

In two significant areas, the Board elected to rely upon qualitative criteria for which they lacked
authorization, instead of focusing upon quantitative and authorized criteria plainly before them.
s release, referenced
Indeed, the Board, throughout their multi-page decision denying Mr.
,
,
random cherry-picked facts from his criminal history but was utterly silent as to his “low”
COMPAS scores for Criminal Involvement and History of Violence. Similarly, instead of

S
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explicitly considering the type and length of his sentence, the recommendation of one of Mr.
s numerous accomplishments, the Board
or Mr.
s victims
instead improperly relied upon the penal philosophy expressed in “community opposition”. As
argued, herein, and infra at IV, the Board not only erred when they failed, again, to meaningfully
consider factors required by statute, but when they revealed the pre-determined and pre textual
nature of their decision.

—

-

.

A Criminal History and History of Violence
The Board’s decision should be reversed because of their failure to properly consider Mr.
's COMPAS scores in the Criminal History and History of Violence categories, and elect
to, instead, rely upon random references to related facts. Indeed, the Board noted, in their decision,
Mr.
“criminal engagements in California” as “extensive and also include[ing] crimes
against law enforcement.” They continued, that he “ha[d] demonstrated a continuation of negative
behaviors that began during adolescence and escalated quickly thereafter” and went on to note his
“course of conduct in targeting law enforcement officers across several jurisdictions” and “other
criminal engagements and violent crimes.”

An individual’s Criminal Involvement and History of Violence are two COMPAS
categories that consider, perhaps obviously, one’s criminal history and history of violence, and
emit a numerical score that can then be deemed “low”, “medium” or “high”. Undoubtedly,
COMPAS was developed and statutorily mandated to provide some consistency and regularity to
the otherwise qualitative task of weighing numerous factors, over time. If the Board sought to
s “low” scores in these categories, they were statutorily obligated to
depart from Mr.
explain their departure. If the Board sought to identify some aggravating circumstance or factor
related to the instant offense, they were required to explain their intention as such. Otherwise,
s quantitatively calculated “low” COMPAS
however, they were required to consider Mr.
score in the categories of Criminal History and History of Violence, and not random related
qualitative cherry-picked facts.

.

B Community Opposition and Penal Philosophy
In its decision the Board not only considered and relied on “significant community
opposition” that conveyed purely penal philosophy, but they gave it greater weight than Mr.
’s accolades and achievements. The Board was clear in their decision that though the
presence of an “appropriate case plan, achievements while incarcerated, and community support
were noted, the “many or more letters in opposition” were of greater significance.
This was contrary to law. Kingv. New YorkState Div. of Parole ,83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994)
(“There is evidence in the record that petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing because one of
the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal
philosophy”); Exec. L. 259 i et seq. Pending the content, “opposition” letters received from
“members of the community” may be considered by the Parole Board when making a parole
decision See Clark v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dep’t., 2018) (“the
Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public

-

.
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officials and members of the community”); Matter ofApplewhite v. New York State Bd. ofParole,
167 A.D.3d 1380 (3d Dep't 2018).
Here, the Board considered and relied upon “community opposition” that exclusively came
from law enforcement organizations or was generated from law enforcement websites, which
categorically advocated for life without parole for anyone who has killed a police officer (“Justice
demands that he be made to spend every remaining day of his full sentence in prison”). All are
from persons who appear to have no personal knowledge of Mr.

This is precisely the sort of consideration and guidance the Court of Appeals found to be
“outside the scope of the applicable statute.” King v. New York State Div. of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d
788, 791 (1994) (“There is evidence in the record that petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing
because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute,
including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death
penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are
not in place.”). King deemed it inappropriate for a commissioner to be guided by his personal
beliefs that killing a police officer deserved the death penalty or life without parole. See King v.
New York State Div. of Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dept. 1993), affd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)
(“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of
its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder...”). Similarly, the opposition material
considered and relied on by the Board which espoused opinions calling for the death penalty and
life without parole is not a “relevant guideline” to be considered by the Board. Id. (“[The Board]
must provide the inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant guidelines are
considered.”).

In addition, the opposition material relied on and cited in the Board’s decision advocated
for the preclusion of anyone who was ‘involved’ in the ‘murder’ of a police officer from “any
consideration for parole.” That penal philosophy should have been disregarded by the Board, but
instead it was considered, relied on, and cited in the Board’s decision. See Kingv. New York State
Div. of Parole ,190 A.D.2d 423, 434 (1st Dep’t, 1993), affd\ 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“For the Board
to simply decide that any case which involves the death of a police officer, regardless of all of the
other circumstances surrounding the crime, automatically necessitates the denial of parole is a
breach of the obligation legislatively imposed upon it to render a qualitative judgment based upon
a review of all the relevant factors.”).3
Significantly, the Board was required to consider the type and length of Mr.
sentence. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (McKinney) states, in relevant part,

’s

In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision
four of section two hundred fifty nine c of this article shall require that the following

- -

3

whether he thought “justice had been served” in this
Commissioner Davis’ decision to ask Mr.
case manifests similar concerning, unauthorized penal philosophy. Indeed, Commissioner Davis stated that
s “emotional state as it relates to whether or not [he] believe[s] that justice
he could not assess Mr.
.
has been served.” HT at 89 For the Board to rely upon a parole applicant’s emotional state as it relates to
subjective, amorphous notions of justice is contrary to law. See Flatten v. N.Y.S. Board of Parole , 47 Misc.
3d 1059 (Sup. Ct., Sullivan Cty., 20150.
10
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be considered... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type
of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court.

[{emphases added).]

sentenced to concurrent terms of 25 to Life, when consecutive
Not only was Mr.
sentencing was more than available, but he was definitively sentenced to a term of imprisonment
that made him eligible for parole consideration, every two years (after his minimum). Mr.
was not sentenced to life without parole, but the Board allowed opposition material that endorsed
life without parole to enter into its decision-making. King at 432 (“Since neither the death penalty
nor life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are part of the law of this state, they should
clearly not have entered into the Board's consideration.”).
Perhaps most significantly, the Board’s decision was silent as to the explicit
s victims —
who has written a letter to
recommendation of one of Mr.
s release. Under the Executive Law, the Parole
the Board affirmatively supporting Mr.
any
statement
or
prior
made to the board by the crime victim or the
current
shall
consider
Board
“
victim’s representative...” Executive Law § 359-i(2)(c)(A)(2)(v). Here, instead of considering the
be released, the Board instead
that Mr.
explicit recommendation of
relied upon the penal philosophy contained within “community opposition” for which they lacked
authorization. They Board’s decision should be reversed and a de novo hearing at which the Board
properly considers the relevant, authorized, statutory criteria, held. See, e.g., Bottom v. N.Y State
Bd. of Parole , 30 A.D.3d 657, 658 (3d Dep’t 2006).

IV.

.

-

The Board’s twice stated conclusion that Mr
’s release would still
deprecate the seriousness of the crime and undermine respect for the law is
irrational, improper, arbitrary, and capricious because it is predicated upon a
can never change, and a willful ignorance as
fixation upon that which Mr
to his having changed everything he can

.

.

The Board wrote at the outset of their decision: “release at this time remains incompatible
with the welfare and safety of society and would still so deprecate your offense as to undermine
respect for the law.” (emphasis added). They concluded with:
Discretionary release shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties while confined. Further, the panel concludes that a
release is not appropriate. A release at this time would so deprecate the seriousness
of the offense as to undermine respect for the law.

—

if after 49 years of incarceration, achieving what he has achieved and
One has to ask
s release remains
developing the insight and emotional maturity he has developed, Mr.
,
deprecate
as to undermine
offense
so
the
welfare
of
others
and
would
still
the
incompatible with
respect for the law, whether he will ever be fit for release in the Board’s eyes? All that Mr.
to address the underlying psychological, social,
can do to demonstrate his rehabilitation
political, and emotional underpinnings of his crime and to commit himself to a set of goals and

—
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—

values devoid of criminal deviance he has done. All that remains is that which can never be
changed: the fact that he took the lives of two New York City Police Officers.4
The First, Second, and Fourth Departments have held that the Board must consider all
statutory requirements and cannot base the decision to deny solely on the nature of the crime. See
King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d 83 N.Y.2d
788 (1994) (“...the legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude
parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.); Rossakis v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 146 A.D. 3d 22, 27
(1st Dep’t 2016) (Holding the Board acted irrationality in focusing exclusively on the seriousness
of petitioner’s conviction and the decedent’s family victim impact statements...without giving
genuine consideration to petitioner’s remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her
lack of any prior criminal history.); V Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole , 2018-100865 (Sup. Ct., NY
Cty., 2019) (finding Board relied almost exclusively on the serf ousness of the crime and statements
petitioner made at time of sentence); Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Where
the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts irrationally.”); Johnson v. New York State Div.
of Parole , 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep’t 2009).

—

—

more improper than conducting periodic
Indeed , there is nothing more irrational
review of an individual when the ultimate decision continues to rest upon things that will never
change. Of course, the presence of certain ‘aggravating circumstances’ will, at times, justify
prolonged incarceration. But here, as demonstrated herein, the Board’s determination that Mr.
lacked remorse and was righteous, that community opposition deserved greater weight
than any positive factor, and that his historic hostility to law enforcement was of “concern”, was
pretextual, and simply do not constitute present-day aggravating circumstances warranting further
incarceration or justifying departures from COMPAS.
Indications that the parole denial was predetermined is a ground for a de novo interview.
See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788. See Johnson v.
N 7. Bd. of Parole , 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on the record before
us that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that there is ‘a
strong indication that the denial of petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion.’”); see also,
Rabenbauer v. N.7 State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 46 Misc. 3d 603 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
Cnty. 2014) (“at least one Commissioner was argumentative and appeared to have made the
decision prior to the parole interview.”); Morris v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013) (“When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely
on the nature of Petitioner's crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone
conclusion that does not comport with statutory requirements. ”) (emphasis added.).
The Board’s decision should be reversed, and a de novo hearing held.
4

—

’s incarceration
the instant offense
It is worth noting that the fact that continues to justify Mr.
s co-defendant, Mr.
in 2018. Like Mr.
did not prevent the Board’s release of Mr.
,
deemed
was
to present
|
disciplined
,
person
and
and
remorseful
a
had evolved into mature
Mr.
similarly
situated individuals no doubt violates the
no risk of future harm to others. Disparate treatment of
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See cons. Amend. XIV.

—
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CONCLUSION
There was a time when parole review in New York was defined by greater concern for the
instant offense than even the most tremendous rehabilitation and remorse. Due to changes in
statute, prevailing attitudes, and the profiles of Parole Commissioners, that time is largely past.
And yet, in the case of individuals who have caused the death of police officers, such antiquated
thinking continues to rule the day. It does so not because it is permissible under law, but because
of the special place, that the police occupy in society, and because of the enduring vitriol and
unique influence of police-aligned associations. This exceptionalism, however, does not redeem
the Board’s continued denial of release to those who have killed police officers; instead, it makes
the case for careful, individualized administrative and appellate review where the correct legal
standard is employed. Mr.
deserves such review, and as such, reversal and a de novo
hearing.

.
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